

AI Browser Agents in Cyber Defence

Leveraging and securing agentic AI for the automation of security operations such as password rotation.

Graduate

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Initial Situation: Modern IT, OT, and IoT environments rely on web-based management interfaces and consist of heterogeneous systems that often lack standardized automation APIs. As a result, routine but security-critical operations - such as password rotation or configuration hardening - remain largely manual and unscalable. Password rotation is critical for maintaining credential hygiene and system security. However, existing password automation approaches rely on explicit API support, brittle scripts or poorly adopted standards, leaving many web applications inaccessible to scalable automation. Recent advances in AI have led to the emergence of browser agents that can perceive, reason about and interact with web interfaces in a human-like manner. This introduces a promising path toward flexible and scalable automation, yet the effectiveness of such agents when performing security-critical tasks like password rotation remains unexplored. At the same time, deploying agentic AI in security-sensitive contexts introduces new challenges. LLM-based agents are inherently non-deterministic and may produce reasoning errors that lead to unintended actions. Further, agents may be exposed to adversarial content and thus be vulnerable to manipulation attacks (e.g. prompt injection) that can subvert agent behavior. As a result, the use of agentic AI for security operations requires careful threat analysis and architectural constraints.

Approach: This thesis designs a multi-agent architecture for automating security operations via web-based management interfaces. To enhance operational security in sensitive environments, the architecture is informed by a systematic threat analysis and incorporates multiple mitigations to address identified risks. Further, the architecture is instantiated using automated password rotation as a representative use case and evaluated in terms of performance.

Result: The proposed architecture executes security operation tasks through a sequence of dedicated agents responsible for login, configuration change and validation. This decomposition allows each subtask to be performed with isolated context and limited privileges. Fig. 1 illustrates how the proposed architecture is instantiated for the password rotation use case, highlighting the use of dedicated tools for sensitive credential handling. The threat analysis identifies several system threats as summarized in Table 1, which are addressed through corresponding mitigations in the architecture. The system was evaluated across 12 different IoT applications with varying layouts and password change workflows. The results demonstrates that the system successfully rotates credentials on all applications with an avg. execution time of 154.2 ± 8.1 s and a cost of USD 0.11 ± 0.01 per rotation.

In conclusion, this thesis investigates the use of controlled agentic AI for automating security operations on web-managed systems and addresses security risks through threat-informed system design. The results demonstrates that the proposed system reliably performs password rotation across heterogeneous web interfaces. More broadly, the results indicate that constrained agentic AI, as demonstrated by the proposed system, can enhance cyber defense by automating repetitive security tasks in environments that were originally not designed with automation in mind.

Figure 1: Password rotation workflow instantiated from the generic multi-agent architecture.
Own presentation





Table 1: Threats identified across the system as part of the threat analysis, addressed by corresponding mitigations.
Own presentation

TID	Threat	Threat Description Summary
T1	Memory Poisoning	Exploiting the agent's memory context to inject malicious or false information, thereby influencing decisions.
T2	Tool Misuse	Manipulating AI agents to misuse or abuse integrated tools beyond their intended purpose.
T3	Privilege Compromise	Exploiting weaknesses in permission management or misconfigurations to perform unauthorized actions.
T4	Resource Overload	Targeting computational, memory, or service resources to degrade performance or cause system failures.
T5	Cascading Hallucination Attacks	Triggering plausible but incorrect outputs that propagate through interconnected systems and disrupt decision-making or tools.
T6	Intent Breaking & Goal Manipulation	Manipulating an AI's reasoning or goal-setting process to redirect objectives, including agent hijacking.
T8	Reputation & Untraceability	Insufficient logging mechanisms enable repudiation, rendering AI actions difficult or impossible to trace.
T9	Sensitive Data Leakage	Unintended disclosure of sensitive data to the LLM, logs or a potential adversary.
T10	Application State Corruption	Transition into unintended or inconsistent system states due to hallucinations, validation failures or adversarial manipulation.

Figure 2: Mechanism of an indirect prompt injection attack and mitigation in browser agents.
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